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American Secretary of State Rex Tillerson chuan Pakistan chu Afghanistan rama firfiak pawl Taliban-te tan tawmrukna hmun siamsak tawh lo turin a nawr ve leh ta.

American Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
American Secretary of State Rex Tillerson

Pakistan chuan US puhna hi a pha a, Rex Tillerson chuan Pakistan hian a ngaihdan a thlaktleng loh chuan US tanpuina sum tak tak hi a chân ngei dawn a ni, a ti.



President Donald Trump chuan Afghanistan rama US hmalak dan tur thar a puan hnu, Pakistan a vau tukah American Secretary of State Rex Tillerson chuan Pakistan hi a vau nawn leh a ni.

Pakistan hi US thawhpui leh sangawi zawnpui a ni a, US atang hian ţanpuina sum billion tam tak a dawng ziah a ni.

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson chuan Pakistan rama sorkar ngelnghet tak a awm hi US leh ramdang tan pawh a ţha a ni, a ti bawk.

Pakistan ram hmelma lian ber mai chu India hi a ni a, Afghanistan rama India a vawk lal len tur hi Pakistan ram hi a hmu thei thlawt lo va, Afghanistan rama hmasawnna tiţhuanawp turin Pakistan hian a ram chhungah Afghanistan Tiliban firfiak pawl hi a kawi ngam niiah an ngai a ni.

Hetianga US ram hruaitu lawkte’n Pakistan an vau ta mai chu China hian a ngai thei bik lo va, Pakistan ram thlavang hauhna thu a chhakchhuak ta bawk a ni.


Arpuia lungchhia Sanghara lung lawm an tih angin US-in firfiak pawl hum tawh lo tura Pakistan a vau tak pung pung lai hian India PM Modi chu a mumang lamah pawh a nui khi vur vur ngei ang le!

Hetih lai hian America media-te chuan an beih fo ţhin President Donald Trump pui roh hian Afghanistan ramah US sipaite thlanmuan a siam leh ţan  mei niin an tarlang chuai chuai  bawk a ni.

Osama bin Laden-a pawl al-Qaeda-te’n kum 2001 Saptember ni 11-a thlawhna pahniha Twin Tower an sut chim hnu khan US chuan Afghanistan ram hi a run ta kha a ni a, kum 16 hnu-ah pawh Taliban hi an la tlawm thei lo va, US sipai an hek malh malh hle mai a.

US-in kum 10 pumpuhlum man tuma a lo veh a lo veh Osama bin Laden lah chu Pakistan ram sipai hmunpui bulah muang leiah kum 2 lai a lo awm ru reng chu lo niin! US sipai commando-te chuan Pakistan sorkar hriat lohvin May 2, 2011 khan Abbottabad-a Osama bin Laden chenna  an luhchilh a, an dahţha ta kha a ni a. Hnar hnuaiah phatna a bo lo va, Pakistan sorkar chuan an ram chhungah Osama bin Laden a tawn ru tih reng reng kan hre lo! tiin tai pawng pawngin an la ţang kawh ngam zuk nia le!

Mi chunga Anchhia kan lawh pawh hi a kal kual a kal kual a, a tawpah anchhe lawhtu chungah bawk a tla leh thin an ti a. Chutiang deuh bawk chuan US hian a chi tuh rah a seng a ni. Afghanistan rama Russia ral a len lai khan US chuan Pakistan phungbawmah sawmin pawisa leh ralthuam a pe ngheng ngheng a, US pawisa hmangin Pakistan ramah firfiak pawl dinna sikul tam tak an siam a, Afghanistan rama firfiak pawl Muhajideen te’n Russia te an bei ta a. Russia chu Afghanistan ram atangin mei khupin an tlanchhe ta ngei a.


A hnu lawkah Muhajedin duh khawp lo firfiaka kal pawl  Taliban chu Afghanistan ramah an lo lian a, sorkarna an siam ta hial a, an thlazar hnuai atangin Osma Bin Laden chuan US khawpui New York Twin Tower a bei ta a. US hian kum 16 chhung Afghanistan rama Talibante a do ta a, a la hneh lo va, sipai thawn belh leh a tum ta a, Afghanistan ram chu US sipaite thlanmualah a lo chang leh dawn ta niin a lang.



Kum 16 chhunga Afghanistan rama Taliban leh hel pawl dang thi zat chu 42,100 an ni a, Taliban hi sipai 35,000 vel an nei leh tawh a, an indo chhunga Afghan civil mi thi zat chu 31,419 a ni a, Afghan sipai leh police thi zat 30,470 a ni a, Midang thi zat 3,946, US aipai thi zat 2,371 leh US sangai zawnpui sipai thi zat 1,136. Kum 2001-2016 chhunga Afghannistan ram indonaa thi zawng zawng belhkhawmin 111,442 an ni.

Obama hun lai kum 2014 khan US sipaite hian a thuphung chuan Afghanistan ram chhuahsan vek tawh tura tih an ni nachungin Taliban ral an lo len leh tual tual avangin tunah hian US sipai 8,000 vel an la cham bang a. Afghanistan sorkar hian an ram bung zatve chiah an thunun thei a, a bak a chanve chu Taliban kutah a tlu leh mek a ni. Tunah hian Whilte House chuan Afghanistanramah hian sipai 4000 vel thawn leh nghal a tum mek a, Taliban chuan US sipaite thlan khur tur kan lo lai mek a ni, an ti a. Mu, chunga leng leng , tu chungah tla ang maw? tih ang khan US sipai tute chungah tak thihna thla zar ang maw?

US Afghanistan: Tillerson ups pressure on Pakistan

American Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has increased pressure on Pakistan over its perceived backing for the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Pakistan denies sheltering the Taliban, but Mr Tillerson suggested it could lose US privileges if the government failed “to change their posture”.

He was speaking a day after President Donald Trump unveiled a new strategy, vowing to commit US forces to back Afghan forces fighting the insurgents.

The US is a key ally of Pakistan.

The country enjoys a special status as a non-Nato alliance partner and receives billions of dollars in aid.

But Mr Tillerson said these “could be on the table for discussion if in fact they are unwilling to change their posture or change their approach to how they are dealing with the numerous terrorist organisations that find safe haven in Pakistan.

“It is in Pakistan’s interest to take those actions.”

Nuclear power

Mr Tillerson also stressed that having a stable Pakistan was in US and other countries’ interests.

“They are a nuclear power and we have concerns about the security of their weapons. This is not a situation where the US is saying ‘this is us and you’.”

Mr Tillerson said the Taliban must be made to understand that they could not win a battlefield victory in Afghanistan. But he suggested the US might not either.

“We may not win one but neither will you,” as he put it, adding that negotiation was the way to bring the conflict to an end.

Analysis: Barbara Plett-Usher, BBC State Department correspondent

Pakistan has for years deflected US criticism over the issue of safe havens for Taliban and other militants active in Afghanistan.

That’s partly because Islamabad sees the groups as leverage to prevent its arch-rival India from gaining influence there. It’s unlikely that the Trump administration will be able to change Islamabad’s strategic calculations, especially as the president has now encouraged India to play a greater role in Afghanistan.

Rex Tillerson did mention ways that Washington could press Pakistan, such as withholding military aid and reassessing its status as a major non-Nato US ally.

But he also acknowledged concern that too much pressure could destabilise Islamabad.

He offered US help to deal with any blowback from a crackdown on the militants. And he suggested that India take some “steps of rapprochement” to ease Pakistan’s concerns.

On Monday night, Mr Trump unveiled a new Afghan strategy, committing the US Army to the open-ended conflict, despite previously advocating its withdrawal.

President Trump warned a hasty US withdrawal from Afghanistan would leave a vacuum for terrorists to fill and said he had decided to keep troops there to “fight to win” to avoid the mistakes made in Iraq.

He said his new approach would be more pragmatic and based on conditions on the ground rather than idealistic and time-based, and would switch from nation building to “killing terrorists”.

But Mr Trump refused to be drawn on how many extra troops, if any, would be deployed and gave no timeline for ending the US presence in the country.

Washington is thought to be ready to send up to 4,000 additional troops.

Mr Trump also, for the first time, left the door open for an eventual peace deal with the Taliban, saying: “Someday, after an effective military effort, perhaps it will be possible to have a political settlement that includes elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan.”

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani thanked the US for supporting “the joint struggle against the threat of terrorism” in Afghanistan.

The Taliban promised to make Afghanistan a “graveyard” for US forces.

India’s foreign ministry said it shared Mr Trump’s concerns over safe havens and “other forms of cross-border support enjoyed by terrorists”.

US combat operations against the Taliban officially ended in 2014, but more than 8,000 special forces continue to provide support to Afghan troops.

The Afghan government continues to battle insurgency groups and controls just half of the country.

Trump’s Afghanistan plan: Can it actually work?

Analysis By Nic Robertson, CNN

Updated 1548 GMT (2348 HKT) August 22, 2017

(CNN)On Monday night, President Donald Trump unveiled his new strategy for American involvement in Afghanistan — a country that has been the stage for a seemingly unwinnable war for 16 years.

There was not much in terms of specifics, though Trump did reveal that more US troops would be deployed and the military would have more freedom to fight America’s opponents as it sees fit. He also singled out Pakistan as part of the problem — implying that unless the Pakistanis stopped providing safety for terrorists, they might lose financial aid from the United States.

Perhaps the most significant revelation was Trump’s desire to find a political solution to end the war — one that includes bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table.

What’s new in Trump’s plan?

The new plan for American engagement in Afghanistan that Trump announced is — until he puts more meat on the bones — the same old plan, only with less accountability to Washington.

Yes, Trump more publicly called out Pakistan as being part of the problem. But he failed to lay out any serious detail, making it hard to see exactly now this plan differs from existing US policy and how it will succeed where the old one failed.

On the other hand, the lack of clarity may keep the enemy guessing: no drawdown dates, no troop numbers, only the threat that the enemy cannot win on the battlefield.

How realistic is it?

Trump said: “Someday after an effective military effort, perhaps it will be possible to have a political settlement that includes elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan.”

A political solution to the fight with the Taliban is the only realistic way for US forces to leave Afghanistan and not give a free hand to al Qaeda and ISIS. In acknowledging this, it is clear that Trump is now listening to the advice of his generals.

If you listened carefully, you’ll have noticed that Trump differentiated between his enemies. This is key to leaving the door open for a political deal with the Taliban. He said that his objectives are to “obliterate ISIS,” “crush al Qaeda” and “prevent the Taliban from taking over Afghanistan.”

The Taliban have responded by seemingly leaving the door open for talks. They couched their threat to keep fighting the United States by saying, “If the US keeps following a war strategy, we will keep fighting them.” That careful use of the word “if” may come to be incredibly important.

Will the tough talk on Pakistan work?

Pakistan fears that India would like Afghanistan to become a client state on the Pakistani border.

Pakistan has long supported the Afghan Taliban to prevent this from happening and as a result has a controlling influence in the Afghan government.

Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, the Taliban have complained that Pakistan has prevented their efforts at negotiating peace on their own terms.

Trump’s demand that Pakistan stop offering a haven to criminals, terrorists and other groups is not new.

But when the United States has previously blamed Pakistan for supporting the Taliban — and in particular the Haqqani network — it has not worked out so well: Vital US troop resupply routes that run through Pakistan have been shut down, local tribes have protested and the government has closed the border.

In such situations, the United States has turned to Russia for help. Russia has allowed resupply trains to run across its territory to Afghanistan. But the Russia route is not ideal because it takes much longer — supplies can take more than a month to arrive, as opposed to days from Pakistani ports.

And the political situation today means that Russia is far less likely to allow United States the luxury of a backup path for supplies, should Pakistan close its borders again.

What does success look like?

Success for the United States in Afghanistan would be a negotiated political solution that sees the Taliban as a political entity in the Afghan government.

It is something the Taliban have demanded in the past. The group is seeking ministerial places as well as senior positions in the army.

The Taliban are a national force that has a nationalist agenda, unlike al Qaeda and ISIS, which both have international ambitions.

Recognizing that — as Trump appears to have — is key. Certainly, it wouldn’t guarantee success, but it would help create conditions where success may be possible.

It would certainly require more diplomatic heavy lifting than the United States has managed in the past. The Taliban have a vested interest in seeing ISIS defeated and al Qaeda diminished — both are threats.

Both groups share a broadly common conservative Islamic philosophy and, to a significant degree, their fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan are drawn from the same Pashtun ethnic group, with similarly strong cultural beliefs. This makes it even more important for the Taliban to gain recognition as a political force to represent their community and shut down sympathy for ISIS and al Qaeda.

And that’s the Taliban’s value to the Afghan government and to Trump: to co-opt them into denying territory to terrorists.

What will it take to achieve the plan?

Trust between all parties is central to this plan working.

Pakistan will have to feel that it can trust the United States to act in Pakistan’s interest as well as its own — something that will be complicated because of Trump’s huge appeal in India.

First, the United States cannot afford to make any mistakes — by this we mean civilian casualties that further damage its reputation. Second, it needs to practice quiet diplomacy and try to build a working relationship with the Taliban — which has suffered the most from American intervention.

India has to hold its venom on Pakistan, which it came close to doing in its statement Tuesday responding to Trump’s address.

And the Afghan government needs to win the confidence of its own people through curbing corruption and cronyism.

This is the only way it can build an army that thinks it has a country worth fighting for.

The fate of Afghanistan has always been in the hands of the generals who are invading it.

Trump’s announcement Monday night has done nothing to change this.

After Trump’s Warning, China Jumps To Defense Of Pak

Trump on Monday committed the United States to an open-ended conflict in Afghanistan, signalling he would dispatch more troops to America’s longest war and vowing “a fight to win”.

World | Reuters | Updated: August 22, 2017 14:30 IST

BEIJING:  China defended its ally Pakistan on Tuesday after US President Donald Trump said the United States could no longer be silent about Pakistan’s “safe havens” for terrorists and warned it had much to lose by continuing to “harbour terrorists”.

Trump on Monday committed the United States to an open-ended conflict in Afghanistan, signalling he would dispatch more troops to America’s longest war and vowing “a fight to win”.

Trump insisted that others – the Afghan government, India, Pakistan, and NATO allies – step up their own commitment to resolving the 16-year conflict, but he saved his sharpest words for Pakistan.
Senior US officials warned security assistance for Pakistan could be reduced unless the nuclear-armed nation cooperated more in preventing terrorists from using safe havens on its soil.

Critics say Pakistan sees terrorists such as the Taliban as useful tools to limit the influence of India. Pakistan denies allowing terrorists refuge on its territory, saying it takes action against all groups.

Asked about Trump’s speech, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said Pakistan was on the front line in the struggle against terrorism and had made “great sacrifices” and “important contributions” in the fight.
“We believe that the international community should fully recognise Pakistan’s anti-terrorism,” she told a daily news briefing.

“We are happy to see Pakistan and the United States carry out anti-terror cooperation on the basis of mutual respect, and work together for security and stability in the region and world.”

China and Pakistan consider each other “all-weather friends” and have close diplomatic, economic and security ties.

China has its own security concerns in the region, in particular any links between terrorists in Pakistan and Afghanistan and Islamist groups China blames for violence in its far western region of Xinjiang.

“We hope the relevant U.S. policies can help promote the security, stability and development of Afghanistan and the region,” Hua said.

© Thomson Reuters 2017

What Trump’s Speech On India And Pak Means For Modi Government

Published: August 22, 2017 18:06 IST

It is difficult to trust President Donald Trump’s speeches – as the last week so disastrously demonstrated to the world, he is quite capable of walking back a speech written by his advisors the next day in off-the-cuff remarks or 2 am tweets. But if you do take Trump seriously for a moment, what should we think about his remarks on Afghanistan, Pakistan and India after a long meeting of the US National Security Council?

On the one hand, there were some troubling aspects to it – after all, nobody likes the US’ relationship with India to be framed entirely in terms that are either commercial (“Indians make billions off us”) or focused on Pakistan (what we call “hyphenation”, as in India-Pakistan”). But if one sets that aside, there is much that New Delhi can take away that is positive from Trump’s latest broadside.

The first and politically most important aspect of it to India is that Trump minced no words about Pakistan. The Barack Obama-led administration had also begun to pressure Pakistan about the terrorists it hosted on its soil, but Obama was typically careful about how he addressed the issue rhetorically. Even his 2016 speech to the United Nations General Assembly on terrorism, which was widely seen in India as a condemnation of Pakistani policy, avoided calling the country out directly.

It is important to understand the effects of how Trump’s speech framed the debate. The standard Pakistani approach to criticism of its record is to declare that it is a “frontline state” in fighting terrorism, and to point out that it has lost civilians and soldiers to terrorism as well. This is true, as far as it goes – but it does not go very far. In fact, expectations that Pakistani “sacrifice” be seen as a defence of its actions – demand which its “all-weather” friends in Beijing tend to satisfy – are the problem. These demands allow Islamabad to maintain a policy divide between how it treats Islamist militants that threaten its own security and those that threaten Afghanistan and India. The point is that Pakistan has to shut down all terrorist support on its soil, and not just those that directly and immediately threaten its own population.

So what has the Pakistani response been? By and large predictable – and self-defeating. Imran Khan has tweeted that fighting terrorism was done to earn dollars: “Never fight other’s wars for the lure for dollars”. It’s odd, frankly, to see the Pakistani military’s favourite politician essentially declaring that the Pakistan army is a mercenary force. And to describe action against the Pakistani Taliban as somebody else’s war. Others have claimed that Trump’s expressed desire to see India play a larger role in Afghanistan will only strengthen Pakistani paranoia about encirclement.
But let’s be clear: Pakistani paranoia about Indian designs is just that – paranoia. Like all irrational reactions, you cannot give in to it a little in the hope that it will entirely dissipate. It has to be shown to be contradictory and irrational if it is to change.

The best way for India to do this is to in fact step up its assistance to Afghanistan, assistance which is focused on enhancing the capacity of the state and civil society. Transparency is useful; the more Indian civilians and Indian cash involved in Afghanistan, the more it will be clear that Indian intentions there are simply to help stabilise a troubled country in our neighbourhood, and one with a population that has a friendly view of New Delhi. We need to welcome more Afghan students and businesses to India as well. Pakistan needs to recognise that the India-Afghanistan relationship is not transactional, nor it is not based on “encircling” Pakistan, but on other enduring links.
It would be foolish to argue that New Delhi does not have strategic reasons to strengthen the Kabul government at the expense of the Taliban. But these are entirely defensive; India does not want the Taliban in Kabul not just because of their roles as sponsors of terror, but also because they provide “strategic depth” to Pakistan, place for the military of a geographically narrow country to retreat and manoeuvre. This strategic reason is well-understood – and it is completely different from the narrative being pushed by the Pakistan military, which wants to paint the Indian strategic approach to Afghanistan as being aggressive, focused on destabilising Pakistan, rather than defensive.

It is important for the Modi government to seize this moment responsibly. There should be no hint of triumphalism in its approach – after all, a task is beginning, it has not been completed. It needs to stay on message and argue that Pakistan needs to clean up its act for the neighbourhood’s sake. It cannot afford to give way to dreaming that Pakistan is on the brink of defeat or dismemberment. This government has a problem with ministers and officials who allow their mouths to run away with them on television. But nothing is more likely to stiffen the resolve of the Pakistani military. The government has to follow up on its independent relationship with Afghanistan and with its neighbours like Iran – and focus on building more infrastructure projects with obvious peaceful implications similar to the dam that Modi inaugurated last year.

Islamabad has few good options left. An end to US sponsorship puts it on the back foot, ever more dependent on China. And it will soon discover that Chinese engagement comes with far more strings than the US’. There is no direct equivalent to the USAID funds that underwrite spending in Imran Khan’s own provincial government in Khyber Pakhtunwa, for example – even if Khan calls US aid a “curse” now.

The problem is simply this: Pakistan has yet to accept that India is going to inevitably be the subcontinent’s dominant power. That will require helping to stabilise Afghanistan – not as a subset of India’s Pakistan policy, but for its own reasons. Trump is the first US president to accept the fact that this is inevitable. The sooner Pakistani elites and the military accept it as well, the sooner they get over their paranoia – and start working to fix their own troubled country.

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